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Orlando Woods
School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore
ABSTRACT
Political containers frame opinions. They play a formative role in
establishing the terms of interpretation, in distinguishing
between assent and dissent, and in determining the extent to
which dissent is publicly tolerated. Whilst it is by now widely
acknowledged that the power and influence of political contain-
ers have been relativised by interconnection, the effects of mov-
ingwithin and between containers – and thusmediatingbetween
different framings of opinion – are under-theorised. Also, the
enabling role of digital media in disseminating dissent, and in
bringing about disproportionate reach and impact, remains
understudied. Addressing these lacunae, this paper explores the
ways in which dissent can be reproduced, reframed, and thus
mobilised in a digital age. It advances the concept of geopolitical
arbitrage to explain how movement can lead to the reframing of
the political containers of origin and destination, and of the object
that moved. By drawing on the case of Amos Yee – a young
Singaporean blogger who was imprisoned for engaging in anti-
religious “hate speech” – I demonstrate how digital media
enabled the mobilisation of dissent by giving his voice undue
attention, and how his movement from Singapore to the US on
the grounds of asylum enabled a reframing of himself, and of the
political containers that he moved between.
Introduction
Opinions are a function of the political container in which they are formed
and expressed; political containers frame opinions, and help to determine
their (un)acceptability within the public domain. Through the rule of law, the
mainstream media, the education system and public discourse, certain beha-
viours, attitudes and values are inculcated, conditioned and sanctioned by
hierarchies of political power. As a resistant form of opinion, dissent chal-
lenges these framings, and, by extension, the hierarchies of power to which
they are attributed. Dissent is an outcome of resistance; the extent to which
an opinion changes from being resistant to being dissident relates to the
extent to which it contravenes and challenges the limits of tolerance that are
prescribed by a given political container. Some political containers are more
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tolerant than others, just as some opinions are more extreme than others.
That said, the role of movement in overcoming the exclusionary effects of
geopolitical boundaries – and in reinterpreting political power by recasting it
within a comparative framework of analysis – remains under-theorised. By
engaging with the observation that ‘the world is demanding more creative
conceptual models to understand the geographies of power’ (Mountz 2013,
831), this paper explores how the mobilisation of dissent in a digital age can
cause power to be relativised. In this sense, “mobilisation” primarily captures
the idea of movement between different scales of analysis, and between
political containers. It also, secondarily, captures how these movements can
have wide-ranging consequences that result in the mobilisation of socio-
political groups in support of, or in opposition to, dissent.
Specifically, this paper advances the concept of geopolitical arbitrage to theorise
the outcomes that arise from moving between different framings of opinion. By
enabling ‘sovereignty [to be] contested, undermined, evaded, called in question’
(Mountz 2013, 832), movement can enable the repositioning of the individual, and
the reframing of the political containers that they move within and between. As
such, geopolitical arbitrage embraces the fact that ‘our world is a world of
‘territorial containers’ but it is also ‘interterritorial’ (Newman and Paasi 1998,
197), and therefore helps to move the discourse of dissent away from ‘the messy
middle grounds where control and opposition, structure and agency, hegemony
and counter-hegemonic action, are all variously mediated’ (Sparke 2008, 423).
Whilst Newman and Paasi speak of “territorial containers”, I use “political con-
tainers” as a broader term that recognises that political frameworks may or may
not overlap with the territory. A political container could, for example, refer to
a state, a religious community, a school, a family, or any other identifiable group
wherein the expression of power is hierarchical. Containers are not, therefore,
mutually exclusive, but ‘comprise instead complex and often contradictory social
worlds inhabited and acted upon by people’ (Massa 2018, 3). As a heuristic device,
political containers help to overcome the “territorial trap” that has long limited
more innovative understandings of the ‘spatiality of sovereignty’ (Mountz 2013,
831) in a world of transnational flows and global interconnectedness.
Whilst these flows and interconnections have posed considerable challenges to
the hegemony of political containers in defining the terms of dissent, so too has the
proliferation of digital media into ever-more walks of life. Digital media have
caused the voicing of dissent to becomemore accessible andmore democratic than
ever before. Indeed, whilst the potential (Davies 2013; Mountz 2013) and limita-
tions (Fenton 2012, 2016; Pickerill 2007) of digital media in bringing about new
“public” spaces of resistance and new forms of radical politics have been well
researched, they are often studied as strategic tools deployed by organised collec-
tives that seek to bring about lasting forms of change. The potential of digitalmedia
for realising more spontaneous and arbitrary forms of dissent remain under-
studied, even though such forms can yield new understandings of the inter-
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relationships between state and citizens in a digital age (after Fenton 2008; Fenton
and Barassi 2011). These dynamics are felt particularly strongly in the controlled
political container of Singapore, where ‘activist voices and critical opinions are
louder online than on the street, and those who speak quietly in the café or in the
park are less afraid to yell, scream and bang the drums in cyberspace’ (Luger 2016,
13). As much as these “voices” and “opinions” have the potential to disrupt, so too
is there a need to integrate them within the ‘popular geopolitical corpus’ (Dittmer
and Dodds 2008, 445) if the ways in which they intersect with existing notions of
power and hegemony are to be fully understood.
With these ideas in mind, this paper explores how the actions of Amos Yee –
a young and outspoken Singaporean blogger – provide insight into the political
framing of dissent, and the role of movement in subverting the hegemony of the
state. Yee rose to prominence in 2015, when, at the age of 16, he was imprisoned
for posting videos online that were critical of Christianity and Islam, and
Singapore’s recently deceased founder, Lee Kuan Yew. His actions were inter-
preted by the Singapore government as “hate speech” that was deleterious to
religious and social harmony. After being imprisoned again in 2016 for a similar
offence, he fled Singapore for the United States. In March 2017, he made
international news headlines for being granted asylum based on his perceived
persecution in Singapore. Combined, the crude and singular nature of Yee’s
opinions, their disproportionate impact, and the effects of his movement out of
Singapore, renders this case study as curious as it is instructive. It highlights how
dissent is framed by socio-political context, and how power can be subverted
and (re)produced in spontaneous ways through digital media; it also reveals how
movement can be a geopolitical act used to reframe political power. Whilst
a recent and growing body of work has started to explore the contested devel-
opment of civil society in Singapore (Hammett and Jackson 2017), more
focussed consideration of the digitally enabled voicing of dissent within such
a context is, with only a few recent exceptions (e.g. Luger 2016; Weiss 2014),
lacking. By filling the lacuna, this paper explores how the interplay of digitally
enabled resistance and interpolitical movement enabled the relativisation of state
power in Singapore.
In the sections that follow, I first provide an overview of existing work on
the political geography of dissent – focussing on the role of political contain-
ers in the framing of opinion, and the subversive power of digital media –
and then expound the role of geopolitical arbitrage in mediating political
containers. The subsequent empirical section draws on an analysis of media
coverage (primarily from Singapore, but including some international
sources as well) to explore how the political context of Singapore first served
to frame Amos Yee, but subsequently how Yee’s movement to the US served
to (re)frame both Singapore and the US in a more relative light. I conclude
by proposing avenues for further research.
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The Political Geography of Dissent
Howwe think and behave is, to a large extent, influenced by the political container-
(s) in which we are raised and in which we live. Some containers are more
prescriptive thanothers, just as some individuals aremore (com)pliant than others.
Social, political and cultural norms overlay such containers, and help to define the
differences between what is acceptable and what is not. At the country level, such
definitions are imposedhierarchically from the top-down; from the state – through
themainstreammedia, education and legal systems, public discourse and debate –
to citizens, creating a situation whereby the ‘permeation of stateness into the
everyday is evident in almost every area of social life… often in ways that are so
taken for granted they are barely noticeable’ (Painter 2006, 753). At a more
granular level, such definitions are reproduced and challenged within families
and identity-based communities (such as those pertaining to religion, ethnicity,
language or sexuality), and through social and professional networks. These
definitions are used to unite and divide; to provide a common framework of
understanding for people that live within one political container, and a point of
difference from those that live in others. Thus, the political geography of dissent is
concerned with ‘how certain political, social and physical geographies in turn
enframe and incite certain conceptual, moral and/or aesthetic understandings of
self and other’ (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1999, 4).
That said, as the world becomes more interconnected in more (different) ways,
such understandings become more relativised constructs. Increasingly, relativisa-
tion reflects the fact that political elites do not have amonopoly of control over the
shape and extent of such framings. Instead, they are liable to subversion by ideas
that may contradict the prevailing orthodoxies of the political container within
which an individual is situated. Whilst such ideas may originate from inside or
outside a political container, they play an important role in undermining the ability
of the state to ‘enforc[e] their will over their own citizens’ (Painter 2006, 752).
Moreover, the diffusion of such ideas has been significantly enabled by the pro-
liferation of digital media, with research starting to recognise the fact that ‘cyber-
spatial interaction and appropriation can be theorized as socially constructed and
bounded within broader sociopolitical structures’ (Woon 2011, 133). This section
explores these ideas; first by providing an overview of the relativisation of political
containers, followed by a discussion of the subversive power of digital media.
Boundaries, Scale and the Relativisation of Political Containers
Boundaries demarcate the extent of political control over people. Traditionally,
the construction of boundaries has been an important tool of statecraft, as they
are used to determine and exploit differences and distinctions – ideologically,
symbolically and more practically as well – between the self and other. Yet, in
a postmodern world of movement and interconnection, such differences and
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distinctions have been weakened by the effects of comparison, relativisation and
transgression. Thus, whilst boundaries evoke ‘deep symbolic, cultural, historical
and religious, often contested, meanings for social communities’ (Newman and
Paasi 1998, 187), interconnection provides an array of opportunities for com-
munities, or members of communities, to challenge or reject such meanings.
Interconnection contributes to a “multiperspectival” understanding of bound-
aries, which can help to undermine traditional hierarchies of power (Rumford
2012), and can contribute ‘new theoretical insights about a whole range of
general social processes present across a wide variety of apparently unrelated
phenomena’ (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 168). Occupying a position of margin-
ality may, for example, no longer be associated with occupying a position of
weakness, but can be a form of strength instead. In such cases, strength often
emanates from outside political containers; it stems from both political inter-
connection (lateral connections between people and groups located in different
political containers), and from territorial transcendence (connecting people and
groups to the idea(l)s that transcend any given territory). As Marden (1997) put
it over two decades ago:
we are witnessing new political spaces outside the constructed boundaries of the
state system. These spaces are composed of networks of economic, social and
cultural relations, and occupied by the conscious association of actors, in separate
locations, linking themselves through networks for specific political and social
ends.
Connecting to outside sources of influence – both lateral and transcendent –
enables different ways of being in the world. These “ways of being” are often
sanctioned by different forms of authority and idea(l)s, and can, therefore, occur at
different, overlapping, and sometimes conflicting scales. Mediating between these
ways of being can result in a form of “dissident geopolitics” that ‘transcend[s] the
boundaries imposedby the state’ and is validated by a ‘higher level of authorization’
instead (Woods 2012, 210). Whilst feminist scholarship, in particular, has made
notable advances in approaching scale in a more transgressive way – by ‘binding
everyday experiences to wider networks of power and privilege’ (Pain 2009, 475)
and showing how ‘meanings are alternately opened up and closed down bymacro-
and micro-scale structuring influences’ (Dittmer 2008, 284) – there is still
a tendency for political geography to be indentured tomore fixed, and hierarchical,
notions of scale. That said, the rescaling of discourse leads to the reframing of
power, as the scale is ‘not socially or politically neutral, but embodies and expresses
power relationships’ (Swynegdouw 1997, 140). In response to recent calls for the
abandonment or reconfiguration of fixed political containers (Laine 2016;
Marston, Jones, and Woodward 2005; Moisio and Paasi 2013), I consider instead
how the porosity andmediation of boundaries can advance newunderstandings of
the relativisation and fracturing of power in the contemporary world.
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No opinion is inherently dissident; rather, dissent is a function of the political
container in which it is voiced and received. Complicating this is the fact that
individuals are multiply located within various, and sometimes contradictory,
political containers. This can create situations wherein the political containers
within which an individual is located are non-interlocking – that is, they do not
overlap – but may contradict each other instead. In such instances, the boundaries
between different political containers have become ‘mobile patterns that facilitate
overlapping loyalties’ (Beck 2000, 51–52), which in turn can cause the difference
between assent and dissent to become blurred. Insiders can also be outsiders, the
self can also be the other, and an opinionmay be interpreted as assenting by some,
but dissenting by others. This has always been the case, but my point is that the
negotiation of difference has been transformed by the relativising effects of
boundary-crossing (and boundary-eroding) technologies. Such technologies cre-
ate situations where alterity – in all its many guises – is becoming easier to foment,
and harder to suppress. Digital media, in particular, have changed the terms of
engagement between different actors. In doing so, they enable the creation of new
pathways of resistance that can challenge, mediate and disrupt the hierarchical
power of political elites. Digital media cannot eradicate political power, but they
can subvert and reproduce it.
The Subversive Power of Digital Media
In a digitally enabled world, the political geography of dissent is as much about the
channels through which an opinion is transmitted as it is the opinion itself. Digital
technologies enable individuals to build networks of hitherto unprecedented reach
and impact, and have brought about a rebalancing of power in and of the media.
Whilst the media have traditionally been analysed as an elite representation of the
world, digital media have brought about both a democratisation of communica-
tion, representation and participation, and have created a free(r) marketplace in
which ideas and knowledge can be exchanged. Once associated with ‘dominant,
privileged voices who adhere to the ‘rules’ of civility’ (Hammett and Jackson 2017,
3), digital media have since led to an expansion and recalibration of the public
domain (Crang 2010).With such shifts, there have been recent calls to explore and
understand how blogs and other channels of digital dissemination differ from
other, implicitly more traditional political spaces (Davies 2013). The net effect of
such expansion and recalibration is one of disruption, as digital channels remain
relatively unencumbered by the controlling influence of regulation and censorship,
and have therefore become the predominant channel through which resistance to
state control can be enacted. Digital media enable:
mediated activity that seeks to raise people’s awareness, give a voice to
those who do not have one, offer social empowerment, allow disparate people
and causes to organize themselves and form alliances, and ultimately be used
as a tool for social change (Woon 2011, 134).
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In this sense, digital media can be seen to rebalance the relationship
between the producers and consumers of media by removing the power
differential between the two. Put differently, anyone can produce and
disseminate digital content, as the barriers to entry have been reduced to
a “smart” device and an internet connection. This has wide-ranging con-
sequences for the political geography of dissent, as dissent has become
easier to express, share and foment on the one hand, and harder to regulate,
control and suppress on the other. Digital media enable ‘spaces of action
and debate to expand from local/national configurations and terrestrial
media to ‘global’ counter-summits and the internet’ (Fenton 2012, 15).
They enable, in other words, scalar mobility. New forms of “digital scale”
are therefore predicated on the currency of followers, views, comments,
shares, clicks and likes. These digital currencies enable influence and
impact to be scaled-up – and to, therefore, reach more people – with
much greater speed and autonomy than other (non-digital) forms of con-
tent. In turn, popular content is mediated by algorithms and new politics of
digital access and connectivity, which in turn leads to the creation of new
power hierarchies that can amplify and distort opinion. Digital media are
therefore imbued with the potential to shape the ‘imaginative geographies
at the heart of contemporary architectures of enmity’ (Dalby 2010, 281),
which, in turn, can lead to the construction of new, and contestation of old,
hierarchies of power.
Despite the wide-ranging potential of digital media, scholarship has tended
to focus on how the digital domain can augment or undermine the practices
of activist groups operating in the real world. Debates have been framed
within the context of social movements (Pickerill 2007), social mobilisation
(Weiss 2014) or “activist coalitions” (Luger 2016). For example, Pickerill’s
(2007) study of “Indymedia” (i.e. alternative media) collectives in Australia is
described as a project that ‘attempt[s] to implement some of the ideals and
principles of autonomous groups: collective, non-hierarchical, egalitarian,
inclusive organising, and often based around practising consensus’. For
such groups, virtual (or cyber/digital) space presents an arena within which
radical politics can be built and practised. Complementing such scholarship
is a more critical body of work that seeks to moderate the liberatory potential
of digital media, and to thus caution against the danger of treating them in
overly celebratory terms (Fenton 2012, 2016). Specifically, Fenton and Barassi
(2011, 190) highlight three assumptions that underpin “techno-optimistic”
perspectives, and which can undermine the political potential of digital
media. To summarise, they are the tendency for digital media to reduce
politics to the symbolic power of digital content, the tendency for digital
media to ‘focus our attentions on the personal politics of self-representation’
(Fenton and Barassi 2011, 191), and the tendency for digital media to be
divorced from the socio-political contexts in which they are deployed. In
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light of these critiques, alternative understandings of the subversive power of
digital media are needed. In response, Fenton and Barassi (2011, 194) go on
to argue that:
All creative human activity holds the potential for political transformative capacity
but to understand how this potential can be translated into a reality requires an
understanding of the enduring social and political structures that surround and
preexist certain individuals and their relations with others.
The point here is that individual action – whether construed as dissenting or
not – is both a reflection of, and is mediated by, the socio-political structures
from which it originates. Echoing this sentiment, Fenton (2008) calls for
a discursive shift from ideas of “resistance” to those of “political projects”, the
aim being to develop greater understandings of ‘the means and meaning of
being political’ (Fenton 2016, 49), and how digital media may (dis)enable
a ‘collective consciousness [to] be developed and maintained’ (Fenton 2008,
230). In response to these critiques and assertions, I consider below how
digital media can enable autonomous and individualised forms of opinion
and dissent to be expressed and circulated. Such forms can be spontaneous,
capricious, and disconnected from any formal political agenda. Yet, they can
be no less powerful than more organised forms of resistance, as autonomous
voices are empowered to leverage digital scale and the idiosyncrasies of the
socio-political context in order to yield disproportionate political effects
through the digital domain. The mobilisation of dissent – or its movements
within and between political containers – is integral to the realisation of such
effects, and the relativisation of political power (after Fenton 2012, 2016).
Movement can, therefore, contribute theoretical insight into the ways in
which political containers are mediated, and their power relativised. These
ideas are now considered using the concept of “geopolitical arbitrage”.
Geopolitical Arbitrage and the Mediation of Political Containers
Geopolitical arbitrage theorises the effects of moving within and between poli-
tical containers, and the subsequent (re)interpretation of such containers within
a comparative analytical framework. As such, it accords with the recent trend
towards geopolitical analyses ‘displacing attention on borders to the crossers of
borders themselves’ (Hyndman 2012, 243). Whilst existing research has
explored how boundaries help to create ‘normative patterns that regulate and
direct interactions between members of social groups, as well as the rules of
exchange of people, goods and symbolic messages’ and how such rules can, at
times, be ‘crossed and transgressed’ (Newman and Paasi 1998, 194), relatively
little is known about what happens when they are compared throughmovement.
Building on feminist understandings of scale and nonfixity, geopolitical arbit-
rage ‘employ[s] mobility as an analytic of geopolitical power and accountability’
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(Hyndman 2001, 213), and deploys it to create new understandings of how
power can be a cause, method and effect of mobility. In various ways, mobility is
power; ‘some are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and
movement, others don’t; some are more on the receiving end of it than others;
some are effectively imprisoned by it’ (Massey 1993, 61; see also Cresswell 2006;
Delaney 2014). This perspective –which views power as being embeddedwithin,
and evolving throughout processes of (non-)movement – can lead to the
reframing of political containers, and the objects that move within and between
them, in amore relative light. In turn, themovement serves to both rebalance the
power differential between context and agent, and broaden the scope of analysis
beyond traditional, often territorially defined, framings of power (Laine 2016).
To date, arbitrage has been theorised by geographers exclusively in terms
of migration. “Geoarbitrage” has been interpreted as a lifestyle strategy that
involves moving to a country with a lower cost of living (e.g. Hayes 2014;
Hayes and Pérez-Gañán 2017). Geopolitical arbitrage is a more specific
interpretation of “geographical arbitrage”. By treating “movement” in
a polyvalent sense – as processes of boundary-crossing that could be physical
(such as the crossing of borders between countries), discursive (such as
converting from one religion, gender, sexuality or nationality to another)
or scalar (such as lodging of opinion and dissent online) – it focusses
analytically on how movement can bring about both a destabilisation, and
rebalancing, of power. Important for such an analytical approach is the
premise that boundaries are used to define political containers, but they
may or may not overlap with the borders of a territorially defined nation-
state (a political container could, for example, denote a religious or other
community). In this sense, boundaries are deployed as resources for mobility,
as they enable the (re)framing of the object that moved, and of the political
containers it moves between. Through geopolitical arbitrage, the power of
mediating between the distant and the proximate can be realised. If the
distance is ‘the space between us that establishe[s] difference and generates
particular and local political concerns’, and proximity ‘the space that brings
us together on common ground with universal concerns’ (Fenton 2008, 240),
then geopolitical arbitrage is a strategy through which these distinctions can
be redefined. It enables individuals to realise situations whereby the distant
becomes proximate, the proximate becomes distant, and the power associated
with each position is relativised.
The value of the analytical framework of geopolitical arbitrage, therefore, is
that it focusses attention on both the differences between the political container
of origin and destination, and how these differences can trigger various pro-
cesses of reframing. Building on the idea that boundaries are ‘one of our most
fertile thinking tools’ because they ‘capture a fundamental social process, that of
relationality’ (Lamont andMolnár 2002, 169), my argument is that movement is
never apolitical; instead, it is a way of gaining some sort of leverage or advantage.
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Geopolitical arbitrage, therefore, helps to reveal how dissent is a mobile phe-
nomenon that ‘overflows the political containers to which it has been materially
and analytically confined’ (West 2006, 283). Movement can change the risk
profile of an individual, and can empower them to take action, to exert agency,
and thus to forge new pathways of (and to) power (Massa 2018; Sparke 2008).
Movement is a vehicle of power, a manifestation of the agency. As Cresswell
(2006, 6–7) reminds us, ‘movement is rarely just movement; it carries with it the
burden of meaning and it is meaning that jumps scales’. With this in mind, the
movement of bodies builds on feminist scholarship that explores the ways in
which the body can become a site of resistance in and of itself, as ‘differences are
inscribed onto the body and reveal the operation of power through visibility’
(Mountz 2004, 325). The ramifications of movement can be far-reaching, as it
not only leads to a reframing of the object being moved, but also a more
relativised interpretation of the points of departure and arrival.
Having explored the political geography of dissent, and introduced the con-
ceptual framework of geopolitical arbitrage to explain how movement can enable
new forms of power, I now validate the framework using the case of Amos Yee. In
the section that follows, I showhowYee’smovement fromSingapore to theUS and
the subsequent granting of asylum is a case of geopolitical arbitrage in praxis. The
analysis covers a two-year period (from May 2015 to April 2017), and, whilst it
primarily draws on Singapore’s foremost (and state-controlled) news outlet – The
Straits Times – I also include international news sources where relevant.
Movement, Mediation and the Reframing of Amos Yee
An island city-state of approximately 720km2, the political container of Singapore
is defined by both its size and its authoritarian state. These two characteristics are
mutually reinforcing, as the country’s small size means that state power can easily
be transferred to the population, whilst the authoritarian state wields a high degree
of control over both its territory and its populace. The expression of dissent is
relatively rare and often involves isolated cases, which reflects the fact that there is
widespread acceptance of the ‘hegemonyof the state in framing collective goals and
imposing its ideological narrative from the top’ (Kong and Woods 2016, 109).
With a multi-ethnic (comprising majority Chinese, and minority Malay, Indian
and Other groups) and multi-religious (comprising Buddhist/Taoist, Christian/
Catholic,Muslim andHindu groups) population, the state actively promotes racial
and religious harmonyon the one hand, and actively censors and blocksmedia that
could negatively affect such harmony on the other. This has contributed to what
Hammett and Jackson (2017, 4) describe as a ‘paternalistic narrative of obedience
to centrally-dictated national development agendas and strict regulation of poli-
tical activities’. This “narrative of obedience” is enforced through the emplacement
of clearly defined limits to the freedom of expression, the aim being to prevent
“protest, criticism and expression culminat[ing] in nuisance or something even
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more serious” (Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for Home Affairs, cited in Hammett
and Jackson 2017, 5), and to safeguard inter-racial and inter-religious harmony.
Various restrictions have rendered Singapore’s public domain one of strict
regulation, control and censorship. The Sedition Act of 1985, the Public
Entertainments and Meetings Act of 2001 and, most recently, the Public
Order Act of 2012 restrict the possibility for group assembly and speech.
Combined, they seek to control (and therefore restrict) the generation of
loud noises in public places, and to regulate the times and places of public
discussion. Thus, the fact that a police permit is required for any form of
public assembly, combined with the state-controlled media network, serves to
regulate the terms of discussion and debate in Singapore. Regulation is most
stringent when it comes to political debate, or potentially divisive issues of
political concern (Lee and Kan 2009). In 2000, a concession was granted
when Speaker’s Corner was established in Hong Lim Park (located in
Singapore’s Central Business District). Providing a point of assembly for
citizens wishing to speak freely and protest about issues ranging from the
recognition and rights of homosexuals (enshrined in the annual “Little Pink
Dot” rally) to demands for political liberalisation, the impact it has had on
opening up – or even altering – the terms of public debate remains limited. It
remains a concession within a broader context of restriction and censorship;
a context that is designed to suppress the possibility and potentiality of
dissent. Over the years, this has proven to be a boon for the government
and its policy regime, but has caused the terms of debate in Singapore’s
public domain to be prescribed, conservative and relatively docile.
The censoring of debate is most restrictive when it comes to issues of race and
religion. Singapore’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious population underpins the
need for racial and religious harmony, which provides justification for state-
enforced censorship of (potentially) destabilising content. Thus, dissent – espe-
cially that which pertains to religion – is strictly and publicly censored. The state
typically errs on the side of caution when it comes to the potentially divisive effects
of popular media. For example, it exercised its powers of censorship to banMartin
Scorsese’s film The Last Temptation of Christ, Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic
Verses, and to withhold a public entertainment license for the play Talaq that
explored the theme of domestic violence within a Muslim household (Tan 2008).
Recently, the Sedition Act was amended to enhance the penalties for religiously-
(and racially-) aggravated offences that involve ‘promot[ing] feelings of ill-will and
hostility between different races or classes’ (Tan 2008, 64). In 2005, three bloggers
were convicted and sentenced under sedition laws (unexercised since 1966) for
posting anti-Muslim content online. This highlights the intolerance of (religious)
dissent, the role of digital media in providing channels throughwhich such dissent
can be voiced, and ultimately the ‘recursive relationship between online and offline
political spaces’ (Woon 2011, 133). As this example suggests, blogging has enabled
Singaporeans to experiment with the voicing of dissent, and can therefore be
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interpreted as a “newpublic sphere” that is ‘both a response to, as well as a result of,
regulatory obstacles placed upon the media’ (Lee and Kan 2009, 875). In other
words, restrictions on the possibility of protest in the real-world have, over the past
two decades or so, served to funnel the expression of dissent into the digital
domain.
This funnelling is partly due to the inherent difficulty of regulating the
digital domain, and partly due to the extremely high levels of internet
penetration in Singapore. 4G networks now cover 99% of the island, and
Singaporeans were recently reported to spend, on average, more than 12
hours per day using digital devices (The Straits Times 03.04.17). As Weiss
(2014) points out, this creates an enduring irony in that ‘Singapore has the
most fettered media, but also the most wired and tech-savvy citizenry’.
Cyberspace has, therefore, become an important site of resistance, wherein
‘even the endemically marginalised [can] engage with policies’ (Weiss 2014,
96) and create spaces of activism that resist and subvert the restrictiveness of
the physical domain (Luger 2016). Since the late 1990s, such practices have
become more commonplace, and build on initial attempts to sidestep censor-
ship of the public domain and promote freedom of speech through the “new
public sphere” (Crang 2010) of cyberspace. For example, since 1997 the US-
hosted website, Singapore Window, has provided an ‘alternative news portal
on happenings in Singapore’ (Crang 2010, 341), whilst sites like The Online
Citizen and Yawning Bread have become well-established online forums for
political activism and debate. That said, as much as the digital domain can be
interpreted as a potentially destabilising channel of political communication,
so too can it be a channel through which the principles underpinning
democratic participation in civil society (or, more simply, “free speech”)
can be tested and abused. I return to these ideas below.
In response, the Singapore government has made various attempts to censor
and control the digital domain. For example, in 1994 it pre-emptively scanned all
Singaporean email accounts for subversive content, with the ensuing backlash
against the invasion of privacy highlighting the ‘maladroit steps of a state grappling
with a new informational landscape’ (Crang 2010, 339). Over time, the regulation
of the digital domain has evolved in an attempt to mirror that of the physical
domain, whereby ‘virtually all offline rules aimed at managing social and political
dissent in Singapore have been gradually extended to include the Internet’ (Lee and
Kan 2009, 874). Singapore’s Censorship Review Committeemaintains the right to
restrict the content of any website that is hosted in Singapore, and since 2013
foreignmedia providers have had to apply for licences to distribute content (Luger
2016). High-profile enforcement of policies designed to limit dissent in and
through the media, combined with the Media Development Authority’s power
to block or remove content deemed “objectionable”, has fostered habits of online
self-censorship (or, what Lee (2005) terms “auto-regulation”) amongst many
Singaporeans. For example, Weiss (2014) argues that ‘media activism is whittling
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away at, but has yet to undo, decades of socialisation toward self-censorship,
particularly since ‘out of bounds’ markers remain ambiguous and malleable, and
criminal crackdowns remain possible’. Thus, whilst the internet ‘allows citizens to
alter their relationship to the public sphere’ and thus ‘ascribes [them with] the
powers of democratisation’ (Fenton 2012, 165), they do not provide sufficient
redress to the “penetration/participation paradox” that limits the realisation of
a more politically engaged civil society in Singapore (George 2005; Lee and Kan
2009). Given such a restrictive socio-political context, however, digital channels
can also enable dissident voices to attract undue attention, and to yield dispropor-
tionate effects. With this in mind, the case of Amos Yee reveals how dissent is
shaped by the political container in which, and the medium through which, it is
expressed.
Disseminating Dissent through the Digital Domain
In 2015, 16-year-old blogger Amos Yee made domestic news headlines and
sparked a prolonged public debate in Singapore about the limits of free speech.
OnMarch 27th – four days after the death of Singapore’s revered founding Prime
Minister, Lee Kuan Yew – Yee uploaded an eight-minute-long video entitled
“Lee Kuan Yew is finally dead!” onto YouTube. In the video, he compared Lee
Kuan Yew to Jesus Christ before going on to condemn Christians for being:
power hungry and malicious but deceive others into thinking that they are
compassionate and kind. Their impact and legacy will ultimately not last as
more and more people find out that they are full of bull… Similar to the
Christian knowledge of the bible, and the work of a multitude of a priests [sic]
(Yee, cited by the Ministry of Home Affairs 2017).
Later, he also uploaded an image of Lee Kuan Yew and former British Prime
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, engaging in sexual intercourse. Within a month of
posting, the video had been viewedmore than 1,000,000 times, and had caused at
least 20 people to file police reports against Yee (The Straits Times 09.05.15). Yee
was subsequently arrested and charged with posting an obscene image online
and insulting Christianity; charges to which he pleaded not guilty (The Straits
Times 08.05.15). Upon being convicted, Yee removed the video as ordered, but
reposted it (and the image) within two weeks, noting on his blog that “to the
chagrin of numerous people, I have not ‘learnt my lesson’, nor do I see any
‘lesson’ that needs to be learnt” (cited in The Straits Times 03.06.15) – an act that
the sentencing judge described as an indication of Yee’s “contemptuous defi-
ance” of Singapore’s judicial system (cited in The Straits Times 02.08.15). His
trial sparked widespread condemnation of his actions in the local media, which
culminated in him being physically attacked by a member of the public on his
way to court (the attacker was subsequently jailed). Yee spent 50 days in remand,
including two weeks at the Institute of Mental Health, undergoing psychiatric
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examination. During this time, human rights groups demanding freedom of
speech and the release of Amos Yee staged physical protests in Hong Lim Park,
Singapore (attracting approximately 500 people), and outside the Singapore
Trade Office in Taipei (60 people) and the Singapore Consulate in Hong Kong
(50 people) (The Straits Times 26.06.15; 05.07.15; 06.07.15). On July 6th, he was
sentenced to four weeks’ jail for his actions. He was released on the day he was
sentenced, as the jail sentence was backdated to include his time in remand (The
Straits Times 13.12.15).
Between November 2015 and April 2016, Yee uploaded another video
attacking Muslims, followed by a blog post and photo, and two other videos
attacking Muslims and one video attacking Christians. In the videos, he
stated that:
the Islamics [sic] seem to have lots of sand in their vaginas too… But don’t mind
them, they do after all follow a sky wizard and a pedophile prophet. What in the
world is a ‘moderate muslim’ [sic]? A f*****g [sic] hypocrite that’s what!.. With all
due respect, Christians, you can shove that faith up your ass. Faith! Faith! I’d be
damned at this retardation of humanity. F**k [sic] you, Christian shits (Yee, cited
by the Ministry of Home Affairs 2017).
He was again arrested on account of eight charges; six for intending to wound
the feelings of Christians andMuslims, and two for failing to report to the police
for investigations (The Straits Times 19.08.16). Again, he was physically attacked
by a teenager in a shopping centre shortly after being arrested (the teen was
subsequently sentenced to ninemonths’ probation and 100 hours of community
service). Fifteen months after being sentenced for his original offences, on
September 29th 2016, Yee was found guilty of all eight changes, and was
sentenced to six weeks’ jail and fined $2,000. The sentencing judge condemned
Yee’s “contemptuous and irreverent remarks” that were designed to undermine
social harmony in Singapore (cited in The Straits Times 29.09.16). His opinions
were latterly described by the Ministry of Home Affairs (2017) as “hate speech”
that contravened the terms of acceptable speech defined by the political con-
tainer of Singapore.
The public prosecution of Yee encourages reflection on the political framing
of opinion and its praxis. Yee’s case is idiosyncratic for at least two reasons. The
first is the crude and deliberately provocative nature of his opinions. Yee’s
rhetoric is not a call for social activism in the face of injustice; instead, it is the
provocative ranting of a teenager looking to draw attention to himself by
pushing the boundaries of tolerance in a context where such boundaries are
closely observed, strongly enforced and rarely crossed (Weiss 2014).
Notwithstanding, Yee’s opinions were amplified, distorted and given dispropor-
tionate influence due to the controlled environment in which they were voiced.
The political container/s in which opinions are voiced and received can serve to
amplify their reach andmeaning, andmust therefore be considered. Indeed, it is
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the combination of (potentially unlimited – see the second reason, below) access
to new audiences, plus the restrictions on dissent imposed by the political
container of Singapore, that caused Yee’s actions to be disproportionate in
their impact. His voice is a singular one, but, as the protests in Singapore,
Hong Kong and Taipei suggest, this combination of factors made his actions
difficult to ignore. Indeed, despite contravening the principles of “free” speech
through his crude and disrespectful rhetoric, Yee nonetheless attracted the
sympathy of activist groups operating throughout the region.
Opinions – dissent – are cultural performances that are contingent upon the
spaces within which they are enacted. The strict regulatory context of Singapore
can be seen to produce an echo chamber that is hyper-sensitive to alterity.
Ironically, this can cause the voicing of dissent to take on exaggerated meaning.
There is nothing intrinsically powerful, impactful or dissident about opinion;
instead, the power, impact and interpretation of opinion is a function of – and
relative to – the political container within which it is voiced. The political
container of Singapore can, therefore, be seen to play a central role in determin-
ing not just the consequences, but also the effects of Yee’s speech (Crang 2010).
Censorship can cause opinions to expand, taking on an inflated sense of mean-
ing, and a poignancy that theymay not otherwise have had if they were voiced in
a less restrictive political environment. Compounding this is the fact that because
digital media are ‘usually non-hierarchical, with open protocols, open commu-
nication and self-generating information and identities’, they enabled Yee’s
opinions to ‘be based in, but [to] spread quickly beyond, [a] specific localit[y]’
(Fenton 2012, 152). Yee’s opinions caused outrage, as they overtly challenged the
state’s normative narrative of civility, and thus threatened to destabilise the role
of civil society in transcending the racial and religious divisions within Singapore
(Hammett and Jackson 2017). Yet, such outrage is as much a function of the
political container of Singapore as it is the “hate speech” that was expressed. By
pushing the boundaries of tolerance, Yee draws attention to them, causing them
to become a point of debate, and of subversive power.
The second reason is related to the first, and concerns how digital media enable
individuals to overcome the limiting effects of space and time in restricting the
reach and perpetuation of dissent. Digital media enabled Yee to reach – and to
offend – a wider audience, which in turn imbued his opinions with a sense of
gravity that stemmed from their (potential) impact on Singapore society (Mountz
2004). They became, in other words, more mobile. From a regulatory perspective,
the problem with the digital domain is that it causes dissent to become agnostic to
the limitations of space and time. Thus, as much as digital media provided
a channel through which Yee could easily circumvent restrictions on the voicing
of dissent in Singapore’s physical realm, so too did they enable his opinions to
perpetuate in cyberspace. Digital media enable the perpetuation of dissent in ways
that cannot be relegated to history, limited by reach, or reinvented and reinter-
preted through the mass media. Instead, they become loaded with the potentiality
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of digital scale, as they can potentially be accessed by anybody that is digitally
engaged, and can easily become virulent if attention is drawn to their unique or
subversive qualities. Digital media, therefore, relegate space and time to functional
roles; roles that provide the contextual parameters that help to shape the inter-
pretation of opinion, but not necessarily the ability to access it. Ironically, whilst the
potentiality of access helps to explain the severity of his punishment, it also drew
international attention to his actions, and to debates around the state of censorship
in Singapore.
Geopolitical Arbitrage and the Reframing of the Situated Self
On 16th December 2016, Yee flew from Singapore to Chicago O’Hare airport
in the US, seeking asylum. Upon arrival, he was detained, pending his asylum
hearing on 7th March 2017. Whilst the US Department of Homeland Security
initially opposed Yee’s asylum application on the basis that he had been
legitimately prosecuted, on 24th March Yee was granted asylum1 after a US
immigration judge claimed that the Singapore government “persecuted Yee
on account of his political opinion” (cited in The Straits Times 25.03.17). In
response to the US granting Yee’s asylum request, Singapore’s Ministry of
Home Affairs (2017) stated that 'the U.S. adopts a different standard, and
allows some such [sic] hate speech under the rubric of freedom of speech'.
Whilst Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs sought to explain why Yee’s
asylum application was accepted, other commentators adopted a more defen-
sive stance. The Association of Criminal Lawyers of Singapore, and the Law
Society of Singapore both released statements expressing “outrage” and
“disagreement” at the view that Yee was persecuted by the Singapore govern-
ment, which was believed to lead to the 'subsequent impugning of our
criminal justice system in the American courts' (cited in The Straits Times
28.03.17a, b). The British publication, The Economist, also weighed in on the
debate, publishing an article arguing that Yee was charged and jailed in
Singapore for political dissent, rather than for the anti-religious “hate speech”
claimed by the Ministry of Home Affairs (The Straits Times 14.04.17). Such
assertions were strongly condemned by Singapore’s ambassador to the UK,
who, commenting on a related issue, stated that 'we will not allow our
judiciary to be denigrated under the cover of free speech, nor will we protect
hate or libellous speech' (cited in Yahoo News 17.03.17).
Yee’s movement from Singapore to the US is a form of geopolitical arbitrage,
whereby gain lies in drawing out the ideological comparison of two markedly
different political containers. In this instance, Yee scaled-up the discourse by
removing himself and his opinions from the confines of Singapore, and rebasing
them in the US. Such removal and rebasing caused them to be reframed; his own
positionality thus changed from antagonist to protagonist; from being prosecuted
to being persecuted; from being seen as a promoter of “hate speech” to a symbol of
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“free speech”. Bymoving between the political containers of Singapore and theUS,
Yee mediated between two opposing framings of opinion, and two opposing
treatments of dissent. His movement brought about a conceptual overlapping of
territory, and a consequent comparison of the politico-legal climate of each (Massa
2018); it brought the restrictions associated with maintaining racial and religious
harmony in Singapore into direct comparison with the freedom of speech con-
stitutionally guaranteed by the First Amendment in the US. Indeed, the
Immigration Judge that approved Yee’s asylum request described him as
a “young political dissident” whose 'prosecution, detention and general maltreat-
ment at the hands of [the] Singapore authorities constitute persecution on account
of Yee’s political opinions' (cited in CNN News 27.09.17). Within Singapore,
therefore, the justification for Yee’s prosecution was that he voiced opinions –
interpreted as “hate speech” – that could negatively affect inter-religious harmony.
Outside the political container of Singapore, however, the basis for prosecution is
nullified and called into question. Thus, whilst I agree that the ‘state’s allure has not
faded, in spite of the fact that many contemporary social processes are clearly
beyond its scope’ (Laine 2016, 465–466), I contend thatmovement renders it liable
to reframing, and to the negotiation of power that comes with relativisation.
Indeed, by removing himself from the control of the political container in which
he was prosecuted, movement enabled Yee to become a vehicle of power that
resulted in an expansion of the terms of interpretation and debate regarding the
place of dissent in Singapore.
Yee’s movement not only led to a reframing of himself, but also served to
connect Singapore as a place of imprisonment, and the US as one of asylum.
Throughmovement, Yee, therefore, caused the terms of the debate to go beyond
the actions of a dissident individual, and to implicate the responses of the
political containers within which he was prosecuted and redeemed as well. On
the one hand, it provoked outside commentators to criticise the intolerance of
dissent by the Singapore state, the authoritarian control it continues to exert over
the populace, and to reinterpret the terms of his prosecution by claiming that
anti-religious “hate speech”was used as a pretext to silence political dissent2. The
responses to such criticisms – those of “impugning our criminal justice system”
and “denigrat[ing]… our judiciary” – reveal the wide-ranging effects of Yee’s
movement on the Singapore state, inter-state relations, and other, non-state
actors as well. On the other hand, it provides an important – and easily over-
looked – reminder of the fact that such criticisms ignore the need for careful
management of Singapore’s multi-religious population, which provides justifi-
cation for the state’s intolerance of (religious) dissent, and the rationale for its
authoritarian control over the populace. In other words, they reveal how criti-
cism of the censorship of dissent is often based on a universal assumption of the
implicit value of “free” speech. Yet, such assumptions fail to recognise the fact
that ‘context makes a difference’ (Moisio and Paasi 2013, 255), and that socio-
historical contingencies can often reveal why every political container is unique
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and autonomous in its framing of opinion. As much as Yee’s movement
provoked international criticism of the Singapore state, such criticisms can be
(re)interpreted as acontextual, reductionist, and colonising in their gaze.
Geopolitical arbitrage can enable not just the empowerment of the individual,
but the reframing and relativisation of political power as well.
Conclusion
Whilst opinions are linked to individuals, the ways in which they are inter-
preted are usually a function of a more wide-ranging suite of factors. Often,
these factors are defined by the political context – or the container – within
which opinions are expressed, received and debated. Political containers play
a central role in determining the extent to which attitudes and behaviours
may be deemed acceptable or unacceptable. In recent decades, such contain-
ers have become more interconnected, whilst digital media have provided
channels through which dissent can be expressed and fomented. Combined,
these forces have caused the power of the state in determining the terms of
dissent to become relativised. By developing and applying the concept of
geopolitical arbitrage, I have shown how movement within and between
political containers can lead to both the reframing, and the empowerment,
of the individual. Geopolitical arbitrage heralds the agency associated with
movement, and the associated crossing of boundaries. In turn, this reveals
how individuals are able to not just reframe themselves through movement,
but the political containers that they traverse and connect as well.
To advance the ideas introduced in this paper, I propose two, inter-related
avenues for further research. The first relates to the regulation of dissent in
a world where digital media have enabled anyone to have their opinions
reach a potentially global audience. Digital media problematise existing
regulatory frameworks, and foreground the need to fundamentally rethink
the application of legal rules, relationships and strategies of governance
within cyberspace. This is particularly important given that ‘legal practices
and cultures of legality are in relationships with spatial settings’ (Bennett and
Layard 2015, 411). Digital media can cause regulation to become a more
democratic process, as it is less about restricting actions and censoring
content, and more about the resonance of the opinion that is voiced. Thus,
whilst political containers will continue to play a role in framing opinions,
their ability to censor them is vastly diminished. This decoupling of the
online and offline worlds problematises the view that ‘daily lives do not
encounter a great divide of offline and online worlds, but rather feed the
one into the other in subtle and continuous interplay’ (Crang 2010, 328).
With decoupling, however, we can expect new forms of regulation to emerge
that are less concerned with policing the channels of dissemination, and
more about adjusting the framework of interpretation instead.
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The second relates to an expansion of the concept of geopolitical arbitrage,
specifically through a focus on understanding the effects of movement on pre-
existing politico-legal structures of power. As such, geopolitical arbitrage provides
a theoretical vehicle that can inform the ongoing development of the burgeoning
subfield of legal geography. The rule of law ‘draws lines, constructs insides and
outsides, assigns legalmeaning to lines, and attaches legal consequences to crossing
them’ and thus ‘underpins spatial tactics such as confinement, exclusion, expulsion
and coerced mobility’ (Delaney 2014, 99). To the extent that geopolitical arbitrage
is the act ofmovingwithin and between different political containers, it is a process
that has clear, but also potentially unexpected, legal consequences. In other words,
as much as acts of geopolitical arbitrage can involve escaping spatio-legal (in)
justices, so too can they bring about a reimagination of the limits of the law
(Delaney 2016). Specifically, whilst geopolitical arbitrage embraces the fact that
the body is empowered to escape the inscriptions of the political container(s) by
which it is framed, such escape often results in it being confronted with new
mechanisms of biopolitical regulation and control (see Hyndman 2012; Rumford
2012). These relate to the lingering effects of the political container of origin on the
individual, and the effects of political containers that are more self-constructed
than imposed. Exploring these effects and constructions will help to reveal the
various ways in which dissent is formed, framed and filtered in the contemporary
world.
Notes
1. Whilst the American Department of Homeland Security appealed the decision, in
September 2017 the immigration appeals board ruled in Yee’s favour. He was subsequently
freed from jail, where he had been kept since he arrived in the US (BBC News 27.09.17).
2. Indeed, in September 2017 the US immigration appeals board noted that Yee had
a “well-founded fear of future persecution in Singapore” (cited in BBC News 27.09.17),
the subtext being that he was “persecuted” for his criticism of the government.
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